Abstract

This paper investigates carbon reduction and pricing decisions in a green supply chain composed of a government, a manufacturer, and a retailer, under the joint influence of carbon tax policies and consumer environmental awareness. A game-theoretic framework is developed to systematically compare four cooperation structures: non-cooperation, emission reduction cooperation, pricing cooperation, and full cooperation. The results show that consumer environmental awareness significantly influences firms’ green investment, pricing strategies, and the government’s carbon tax policy. The analysis further reveals several nonlinear effects under different cooperation modes. In particular, when environmental performance is evaluated in terms of emission intensity, emission-reduction investment improves per-unit environmental performance, although demand expansion under strong consumer environmental awareness may weaken the extent of this improvement. In less environmentally sensitive markets, green investment translates more directly into environmental improvement. Pricing cooperation provides strong incentives for firms to reduce emissions, whereas full cooperation achieves a better balance between environmental and economic performance. This study enriches the theoretical foundation of green supply chain coordination and offers practical insights into carbon tax design and sustainable collaboration strategies.

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