Abstract

Cross-border remanufacturing trade is developing steadily. Carbon tariffs and carbon cap-and-trade regulation have emerged as two important instruments for carbon governance, yet their independent and combined effects on supply chain operations remain insufficiently discussed, which delivers supplementary analytical space for cross-border remanufacturing supply chain research. This paper examines a cross-border supply chain consisting of an exporting manufacturer and an importing retailer that distributes both new and remanufactured products. Four research scenarios are established: no regulation, carbon tariffs only, cap-and-trade only, and dual mixed regulation. Adopting a two-stage Stackelberg game, we analyze equilibrium pricing, production, and carbon abatement decisions, and further evaluate environmental performance and overall social welfare. Firms with different initial carbon emission levels respond differently to regulatory stringency. The results show that carbon tariffs reduce total emissions but erode corporate profits and social welfare, while cap-and-trade regulation can mitigate such adverse effects. When carbon tariffs are stringent and carbon quotas are sufficient, dual regulation improves all participants’ profitability alongside better environmental quality and higher consumer surplus only within this paper’s simplified analytical context. This study offers tentative operational references for remanufacturing firms and theoretical and analytical implications for governments to design compatible cross-border carbon regulatory systems.

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