Abstract

This study examines the relationship between financial flexibility and firm performance, and the moderating role of corporate-governance mechanisms, using a large panel of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies over 2017–2024. Financial flexibility reflects a firm’s capacity to access and deploy financial resources under uncertainty and is increasingly viewed as central to corporate resilience and value creation. Employing panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects, this study finds that financial flexibility is positively and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q and return on assets as measures of firm performance. Further analysis shows that this relationship is contingent on governance structures: ownership concentration and CEO duality weaken the positive association, while board independence is associated with a marginally significant strengthening of it. Marginal-effect analyses indicate that governance mechanisms systematically condition the value of financial flexibility. A dynamic system-GMM specification qualifies these findings: once persistence and reverse causality are modeled, the unconditional flexibility coefficient turns negative, underscoring that the fixed-effects estimates should be read as associations whose sign and magnitude depend on governance and on how endogeneity is treated. These findings contribute to the literature by integrating financial flexibility and corporate governance in a single analytical framework, highlighting governance as a key boundary condition for the effective use of financial slack. The results carry implications for managers, investors, and policymakers, emphasizing balanced ownership structures, leadership separation, and independent boards in enhancing the performance benefits of financial flexibility in emerging markets.

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