Abstract

The nature of the psychedelic experience, and the distinctive phenomenological features it generates, leaves it susceptible to an unresolved epistemological tension between first-person phenomenological reports and claims about the fundamental nature of consciousness and reality. This tension is examined through the concept of ontological tourism: the practice of treating phenomenological data as sufficient grounds for ontological conclusions without adequate engagement with alternative mechanistic explanations or the philosophical requirements that such inferences demand. This practice, absent adequate epistemic scaffolding, poses a genuine threat to scientific integrity and clinical ethics. At the same time, reflexively dismissing phenomenological data as mere pharmacological artifacts represents an equally impoverished position. The tourist analogy cuts both ways: the tourist may be an unreliable cartographer, but the tourist has been somewhere. An alternative stance is proposed, one that takes subjective experience seriously as a form of evidence without overclaiming its metaphysical implications or dismissing its epistemic weight, along with a framework for achieving it. Ontological tourism risks bypassing the explanatory work that makes psychedelic phenomenology valuable to consciousness science.

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